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Apr 7th 2003 (Volume
7  I  15)
This book results from a recent
international conference on Persons and, like
many such collections, suffers from a lack of
thematic unity. Nevertheless, the mostly short
contributions are of a high quality and several
will be of considerable interest to philosophers
working in the field of bioethics. Being a
volume in a series called ‘Personalist Studies’,
one might have hoped for a definition of
‘personalism’ in order to provide a context for
the various discussions. Without such a
definition, the reader is left to surmise from
the content of the essays that personalism is
at home in a Christian theological tradition
and in a broadly constructivist and historicist
theoretical framework. It would appear that
persons are understood in terms of a personal
identity that is formed within the narrative of
a life and within the constructive context of
interpersonal and community relationships
and within the benevolent regard of God.
However, this latter regard is not theorised by
way of the postulation of a soul in the manner
the natural law tradition. Rather, God is
understood as the ‘Absolute Other’ in relation
with which one’s personhood is realised.
Essentialism in relation to persons is rejected
and, by implication in a fascinating essay by
Chris Belshaw, any essentialist definition of
death. Moreover, one essay challenges the
strategy of many philosophers to define
personhood by way of a set of criteria that
focus on the possibility of self-consciousness
and autonomy.
In his introduction to the collection,
Robert Fisher sees suffering as an inevitable
contributor to our personal identity and, in a
later essay, he asks how we may ‘redeem’
suffering: that is, see it is part of a narrative
that gives it a place in our lives. The problem
with any theodicy is that it objectifies
suffering and considers it from a detached
viewpoint. Rather, we should become involved
in the suffering of those we love. Continuing
this theme, Mike Awalt argues that disaster,
which disrupts the order of a life, requires us
to write about it so as to inscribe the self
within a narrative. David Pailin, in a more theological essay, argues for the worth of severely
disabled humans, while Charles Conti’s stylistically complex essay uses Lacan to argue that
one’s sense of self is formed during the ‘mirror stage’ of infant development. Patricia Sayre
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and Linnea Vacca use the stories of Luigi Pirandello to argue that the kind of distancing in
relation to life and others that narrative control can give has its dangers: that of
impersonalising others and manipulating them. Eric O. Springsted contributes an essay on
how St Augustine’s notion of the will defines our moral identity and is relevant to the problem
of evil.
In what is probably the least satisfactory essay in the collection, Tony Dancer argues
that pastoral care has lost its way by adopting the anthropology of the enlightenment and
thus using psychoanalysis and a variety of humanistic forms of therapy. What it should do is
recover the distinctly Christian conception of humanity and seek to inculcate that.
Unfortunately, instead of sufficient detail to give substance to this claim we are given mere
theological rhetoric. More sensitive to the role of religion in a secular society is Margaret
Morris’s argument that the Christian church has not come to grips adequately with the AIDS
epidemic because it has not overcome the psychodynamic forces within it which lead to fear
and rejection of such diseases and their victims.
At this point the book turns to a set of bioethical issues. The category of personhood
is central to Matthew Bonzo’s essay in which he criticises philosophers such as Dan Brock for
having argued that there is less of an obligation to help people with severe dementia because
they are not fully persons. Like people in a permanent vegetative state, they have no sense of
their identity though, unlike the former, they do have the power to act to a limited degree.
Bonzo critiques this making of decisions in medical ethics on the basis of a classification of
personhood that excludes some from the privileges of that classification. He argues that we all
have obligations to others in that we are enmeshed with them. The difficulty is that we often
have to make decisions in the context of limited resources. Who should be helped when one of
the needy ones has severe dementia? Bonzo argues that there is no decision procedure or
theory which would overcome the need to make the tragic decisions that have to be made.
The obligations we have to others, whatever their abilities or sense of identity, have to be
negotiated in an ‘open discussion’ rather than in the closed terms of essentialism and
bioethical theory. However, it seems to me that this is unsatisfactory if no rules are given for
how this open discussion should take place. Is it just a matter of the various families fighting
over the available resources, motivated by their obligations to their loved ones? Or must they
be able to stand back, adopt an impartial stance and discuss the issue in the light of the
requirements of justice? And if the latter, won’t there be a need for objective criteria of the
kind that Brock as enunciated?
A further attack on mainstream bioethical positions comes from Gavin J. Fairbairn who
argues against those theories of persons that posit a range of criteria for personhood (such as
self-consciousness, autonomy, etc) by calling them arbitrary. Given that he admits that such
views are developed on the basis of seeing what features are present in paradigm cases, what
is his basis for calling this mode of argument arbitrary? Seeing as I plan to counter his
argument I had better quote it in full. Fairbairn says ‘No reason exists at all to say that
displaying one or more of the set of characteristics that we value in human persons is what
makes a person, a person. This would be like saying that because we value green apples for
their greenness, crunchiness, and bitter sweetness, what makes them green apples is their
greenness, bitter sweetness, and crunchiness.’ And he goes on to say that this is absurd
because ‘anything else which shared one or more of these characteristics would by such a line
of reasoning be a green apple.’ (131) But this mistakes the practical form of the bioethical
position. Mainstream bioethicists offer arguments in practical ethics rather than arguments
just about how things should be classified. It is not simply that persons are classified as such
on the basis of a set of criteria. Leaving aside the adequacy of such criteria, it is important to
see that the form of such arguments is driven by the need to understand what we should give
value to and what we should do in relation to such things. That we classify persons as persons
because they fulfil the relevant set of criteria has immediate practical applications. We already
have the moral norm that persons are to be valued. The question is that of deciding which
entities that norm applies to. This question is answered by saying that it applies to all and
only those entities that fulfil those criteria. And a consequence of this argument is not only the
familiar one that if a human organism could not fulfil those criteria then it need not be given
the respect due to persons, but also that if non-human entities were found that did fulfil these
criteria (for example if great apes were found to display them) then we would have to accord
them the same kind of respect we give to human persons. It follows from this that, unlike
‘green apples’, ‘person’ is not a purely classificatory concept. It is an ethical concept. It is not
applied just on the basis of classificatory criteria. It is applied as part of an ethical decision to
treat that to which it is applied in accordance with a relevant moral norm. If the concept of
‘green apples’ were a moral concept in this way then it would not be absurd to say that
because a given entity was green, crunchy, and bitter sweet it was a green apple. Saying that
would not simply mean that this entity belonged to a certain category, but rather that we
should treat this entity with the same respect as that which we give to green apples.
The essay by Chris Belshaw which I mentioned above reviews the circumstances
under which a definition of death is said to be important for making ethical decisions, like
removing organs for transplantation, but argues that once we have given a description of the
situation (‘the patient is still breathing, but has no possibility of consciousness’ for example)
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we have all the facts we need to make a moral decision. There is no further fact called ‘X is
dead’ that will settle the moral issue. Offering definitions and describing necessary and
sufficient conditions for death is useless. There will be clear and obvious cases, of course, but
borderline cases such a people in a permanent vegetative state are not solved by having a
definition of death. Moral decisions have to be taken on the basis of what is evident before us
rather than in terms of an essentialist definition of death.
For his part, John Lizza does not heed Belshaw’s advice and after a very thorough
review and critique of the relevant literature says: “Death can be defined as a change in kind
of living entity marked by the loss of some essential property. The criteria for the death of a
person or human being will therefore be determined by the loss of whatever properties are
deemed essential to the nature of persons or human beings.” (164) He goes on to argue that
what are deemed to be the essential properties of persons is culture relative, but, in the west,
the consensus is that ‘some cognitive function is an essential condition for being a person’
(165). Accordingly, the loss of such functions – which arises from the death of the cortex – is
the death of the person.
Anne Eyre provides a change of pace in an essay which describes death rituals and
beliefs amongst ethnic Chinese in contemporary Malasia and Andrew Dawson draws the
volume to a close with an essay on what it is to be a person which draws on the literature of
Liberation Theology.
While not every essay in this volume will be of interest to everyone, especially to
those who are not theologically inclined, there are many insights to be gained from perusing
the book. In particular, bioethicists should note the essays by Belshaw and Lizza.
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